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POLICIES CONCERNING THE EDUCATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF THE
UNRESTRICTED LINE OFFICER: TRAUMA, TURBULENCE AND TENACITY
And now it may be that survival of the free world will depend
upon knowledge, for the capacity for abstract thought becomes
of steadily increasing importance as our lives grow in inter-
dependence with those of other peoples, as technology increases
the complexity of our industrial and economic lives, as communi-
cations and transportation shrink time and distance, as everyday
occurrences must be interpreted against a background of many
unseen relationships. As men become more and more dependent
upon each other, for their jobs, their food, their enjoyment,
and their security, they must depend more and more upon the best
utilization of the special abilities of each. The state of the
world for some centuries to come may hinge largely upon the
effectiveness with which the United States employs her intellectual
resources.
1
Sustained by a massive research and development effort and by the many
new scientific breakthroughs during and after World War II, the rate of
technological innovation and the speed of replacement of equipment and
weapons systems were unparalleled in the nation's peacetime history. The
vastly accelerated pace of change has had a far-reaching impact upon the
skill requirements of the Armed Services. Changes associated with the
utilization of human talent have contributed to the gravest military
problem now confronting all Services: shortage of skilled manpower.
The Chief of Naval Operations believes that all achieved technological
and tactical advantages will be worthless unless the Navy can recruit and
keep the qualified people necessary to run and maintain the present and
future systems. Dramatic change has conveyed a very real and immediate
need to provide a new spirit of flexibility and modern awareness. Wnat has
The Report of the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training,
Dael Wolfe, Director. America's Resources of Specialized Talent (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 7.

been the Navy's response? Part of the answer to this question can be seen
by examining officer education and assignment policies. This paper dis-
cusses changes in the education and assignment policies governing the
unrestricted line officer (URL) of the surface division as such policies
have been affected by the move to a smaller, more professionally specialized
officer corps. The effort provides instances of change, or resistance to
it, by placing emphasis upon policies which have been originated at the
top by executive deliberation, been imposed from outside the Navy by the
Government or an association, or been implied from consistent actions by
top management.
Since change often involves the demise of one thing and the birth,
or re-birth, of another the paper is also an obituary to some concepts and
traditions. It is particularly painful for the Navy to bury either con-
cepts or traditions and the problem is further complicated by the fact that
conclusive evidence substantiating corpus delictis is not yet fully
admissible because policies and practices are not yet synchronized and
2
perhaps never will be. But, isn't this a large part of what change is
all about?
Before describing some of the changes affecting the education and
assignment of the URL surface officer it is necessary to have an idea of
where this officer fits into the officer structure. In the 1960's the
Navy had some 80,000 officers on active duty and of these about 50,000 were
URL officers whose three great divisions are surface, submarine, and
aviation. The terra "line officer" dates from early sailing periods when
fighting ships were designated "ships of the line of battle" and, eventually,
the officers became known as "line officers." The assignments of unrestricted
2
A phenomena often labelled as "personnel turbulence" in the jargon of the
Navy's personnel administrators.

line officers. can be broadly characterized as those concerned with the
operation of ships, airplanes and missiles, and the use of the seas in
furthering national policies of the United States. Command at sea has
long been the most sought-after assignment and one considered crucial to
3
the attainment of flag rank.
Of the approximately 30,000 naval officers not designated URL about
10,000 are restricted line and 20,000 are staff corps officers. Restricted
line officers are limited to duty in their particular fields of expertise,
stich as communications, law, or public information. Staff corps officers
do not command at sea and are the Navy's specialists in such fields as
medicine, dentistry, the chaplain service, civil engineering, and the
supply corps.
Although this paper primarily examines the changes occurring in assign-
ment and education policies governing URL surface officers, many of the
concepts are applicable to the entire officer structure. Naval service is
very much like being part of one long training-education program and it
is impossible for any officer to describe a naval career without also
4discussing his educational and training experiences.
In Fiscal Year 1970 the Secretary of Defense announced defense cuts
of up to $3 billion. This and subsequent budgetary restrictions imposed
one of the most stringent reductions of manpower and materiels in the
3
Approximately 600 women serve as URL surface officers, but they are not
assigned to duty on ships and may net command at sea. In 1969 promotion
laws were established which would provide for the selection of URL women
to flag rank.
A
It is often impossible to clearly define differences in programs the Navy
describes either as "training" or "education," but the current trend is
away from the use of "training." "Education" now encompasses diverse forms
of any structured learning experience. Some areas discussed in this paper
as "training" programs may also be considered "education" programs.

history of the United States Navy. The deactivation of many overage ships,
the inactivation of aircraft squadrons, and the massive and somewhat pre-
cipitous early release of great numbers of personnel brought convulsive
changes which emphasized a smaller, more specialized Navy. At the end of
Fiscal Year 1968 there were 85,200 officers on active duty; the projected
number for the end of Fiscal Year 1972 is 73,424. This impetus for change,
coupled with that generated by technological and social factors, demands
a better prepared, better educated, and more professional officer corps.
t
The highest priority has been assigned to obtaining the maximum
effectiveness from each person in the Navy and to the continuing pro-
fessional development and education of highly qualified officers. "The
Navy is shaped by the society it exists to defend; as that society evolves
ever more swiftly, it depends more and more upon education to solve its
problems. So, inevitably, does the Navy."
Changes in the Academy and NROTC Programs
Each year the Navy must replace about 10,000 officers who are lost due
to resignation, retirement, or release from active duty. Their replace-
ments come from officers procured through some fifteen separate programs
which lead to commissions in the Navy. It is from the some 3,000 Naval
Academy and NROTC yearly graduates that the career URL officers emerge.
Reforms in the Academy and NROTC programs indicate an expansion of
educational horizons. In general, there is more classroom informality
and a wider array of nonmilitary courses. The Academy has gene from a
faculty heavily weighted with naval officers as instructors to more
civilian professors; from a single, inflexible curriculum of some 50
Rear Admiral James Calvert, United States Navy, The Naval Profession






courses compulsory for all students to over 500 courses offered in 25
different programs; and from a curriculum consisting of survey courses to
more in-depth training. The Navy is expecting fewer Jacks-of-all-trades
to graduate from Annapolis and more specialists in a wide variety of
fields which will fill the Navy's needs in a rapidly changing world.
There is evidence at least in the curriculum of the Academy and those
of other source programs that the Navy is listening to the advice of
educators who "...urge adoption of the principle that the objective of
schools no longer be to teach facts and statistics, but to prepare a
young man to make the best use of his own mental resources. Teaching
principles and skills of enduring value that will help the student to
meet changes with wisdom and reasoning is one of the aims of the Navy,
which is moving away from the expression "education and training" to one
o
of just plain "education."
In the 1960's campus violence made the Navy's ROTC units targets of
attention. Some consideration was given to temporarily closing or remov-
ing all NROTC units from college campuses. Loss of this program would
have brought many ramifications to the entire question of the education
of prospective officers. One very significant aspect concerned the role
of Army, Navy, and Air Force ROTC programs in the all-volunteer force
concept. ROTC units were to train some 13,000 of the estimated 36,000
new officers needed annually for all three services. Would it be wise to
have ROTC disappear so that every new officer would be a product of higher
"Military Academies Changing Their Ways," U.S. News and World Report
,
9 November 1970, pp. 46-48.
Q
Captain Daniel J. Carrison, United States Navy, The United States Navy
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968), p. 183.
"

education directly controlled by the military? This eventually came very
near to becoming reality.
NROTC survived, but not quite in its original form. The campus unrest
prompted re-examination of the program and some of the more tangible
results of this scrutiny have been the revision and strengthening of courses
and the improvement in the academic qualifications of Navy instructors
assigned to NROTC units. It wasn't just the Navy's response which pro-
duced needed reforms because campus unrest "...prompted a number of
professors to examine the ROTC programs more closely—something they had
9been authorized to do all along, but had not bothered about."
The changes described so far approach Mahan's belief that, since each
man's characteristics are different, a naval officer should be permitted
a specialization resulting from the free play of his natural aptitudes.
Although the characteristics possessed by each naval officer described by
Mahan vary, together they represent a completeness of the naval organiza-
tion. Mahan's concepts concerning officer education and assignment would
approve programs in which the officer has more opportunity to "do his own
thing" and a voice in determining just what "his own thing" might be.
Evidence of return to Mahan's theory illustrates a typical characteristic
of change: events repeat themselves.
Mahan's emphasis on a completeness of the naval organization, achieved
through a compact officer corps encouraged to use a wide range of aptitudes,
was largely motivated by the nineteenth century demands imposed upon a
small U.S. Navy. Mahan's concept was lost in the Navy's subsequent growth
to what in the 1960's was described as a big, strangling, nigh desperate
9
"ROTC Stages a Comeback," U.S. News and World Report , 11 October 1971,
pp. 31-32.
Albert T. Mahan, Types of Naval Officers (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
1901), p. x.

military force. By 1970 change had reinstated the idea of compact complete-
ness. Academy and NROTC programs are attempting to achieve this principle
primarily through policy changes which have expanded the numbers and
types of curriculums, and have raised the professional level of
instructors.
Postgraduate Education
More policy changes appear to be going on at the postgraduate level
of URL education than at the undergraduate. One reason for this is the
Navy's desire, and growing need, to offer more of the hard-core group of
mid-career officers greater opportunities to attain some level of advanced
education. By increasing the numbers selected for postgraduate education
and the types of available programs the Navy also hopes to provide a
certain allure and incentive to the junior officer group. Postgraduate
education, generally offered those officers whose job performance places
them among the "best qualified" group, also enhances the officer's
opportunity for assignment to better billets. Postgraduate education is
considered essential for the attainment of choice assignment by those in
senior grades.
Although engineering, the physical sciences and mathematics still
dominate major fields of graduate study, increasing numbers of naval officers
are engaged in economics, management, journalism, foreign affairs, and
theology programs. Since the late 1960's there has been a major
emphasis placed upon education programs concerning computer sciences and
operations research and analysis.
See Appendix I for percentages of URL officers with postgraduate
degrees selected for promotion in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972.

8Along with an increased variety of postgraduate fields is an increase
in the number of programs leading to a graduate degree, and in the number
of institutions graduating Navy officers with advanced degrees. The Naval
Postgraduate School at Monterey awards about 200 Bachelor of Science
degrees and some 300 master's and doctor's degrees annually, and remains
the hub of the Navy's postgraduate effort. The Naval War College, in
cooperation with the George Washington University, award approximately 20
Masters of Art degrees in International Relations annually, and the
American University awards about 10 Masters of Art degrees annually in
Foreign Affairs. About 20 Master of Business Administration degrees are
annually awarded through the Navy Comptrollers Course. Approximately 25
other universities have officers involved in special programs ranging
from Naval Architecture at MIT to Journalism at Wisconsin.
There are presently about 1,600 Navy officer students in post-
graduate education^ 795 of these are URL surface officers. The chief
conclusion reached by a recent study of the Navy's future professional man-
power requirements is that the minimum annual input to the postgraduate
program for at least ten years must be 50% greater than the average
12
annual input has been over the years 1965-1970. Attempts to increase
enrollment will face some familiar problems.
The impact of technological change is reflected in enrollment figures
at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. The School has not been able to
meet its quotas since 1960, and since 1965 has fallen behind, particularly
in the technical curricula enrollment. The basic reason is that since
1960 not enough officers have entered the regular Navy with the necessary
12
Rear Admiral Robert W. McNitt, United States Navy, "The Naval Post-
graduate School Sixty Years Young," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
(June 1970): 69.

undergraduate background needed to qualify for enrollment in the technical
13
curricula. Also, many academically qualified officers were in high
priority assignments wherein their services were so badly needed they
were not available for assignments to postgraduate programs. Although
this generally is applicable to all URL officers, it is particularly
true for those officers in naval aviation and in the nuclear power
program.
There is a need in the Navy's postgraduate education planning for an
advanced and continuing education program which will enable an officer to
return to a well of graduate education two or three times during the
course of a career in order to broaden and diversify technical knowledge
and management competence, and to keep abreast of current developments
in his specialty or subspecialty.
There is also a demand from URL surface officers for postgraduate
programs which can use their undergraduate backgrounds in disciplines
leading either to a useful subspecialty in the Navy, or to the strengthen-
ing of competence in the URL's specialty of naval warfare, or command at
14
sea.
Officers with degrees in such areas as English, government, public
administration, economics, and history often are not qualified to enter
technical curriculums. In general they must apply within the small quotas
permitted for graduate studies in such areas as international relations,
or in the Management program offered at Monterey. Too many of this group
feel shut-off from the opportunity for postgraduate education and not
13
The Navy is seeking effective methods of raising the proportion of
newly commissioned officers who have the undergraduate background needed








enough has been done to establish policies which would permit more of these
officers to pursue postgraduate programs. The problem is being studied and
among the proposals which may be of interest to these potential students is
the suggestion of an interdisciplinary curricular program requiring seven
quarters of study and leading to a Master of Science degree in national
security affairs.
One of the most significant trends in recent years is seen in the
implementation of policy which permits the youngest officers to pursue
postgraduate study. The 1960 's brought increasing numbers of scholar-
ships to newly commissioned ensigns and perhaps the most revolutionary
program of all was launched with the United States Naval Academy's
graduating class of 1967. From this group a select number of ensigns
was ordered immediately upon commissioning to one of three civilian univer-
sities for a one-year period of study leading to a Master of Science
degree in a physical science, engineering, or mathematics discipline.
The program, called the Immediate Graduate Education Program (IGEP)
,
has been expanded to permit student input from the NROTC classes and to
broaden the majors to include such areas as economics, business and
computational sciences. IGEP will make a definite impact upon the old
policy which did not provide postgraduate education until an officer had
attained lieutenant or lieutenant commander grade.
An officer's record of service performance is the primary factor in
selecting for postgraduate education those most "highly qualified." Some
future date may bring needed new policies which will afford more officers
the opportunity for postgraduate education in a wide variety of fields.
Until such time the Navy will definitely fail to educate a number of
officers who, like those fortunate enough to be selected for postgraduate




The mission of a senior service college is to provide the highest
level of professional education to officers serving in the more senior
grades. The Navy's service college is the U.S. Naval War College, Newport,
Rhode Island and the majority of the naval students are in the grades
of lieutenant commander and commander. Advanced education is provided
in the science of naval warfare and in related subjects intended to
improve the officer's professional competence for higher responsibilities.
The College consists of three resident colleges (courses) , a War Gaming
Center, and a Center for Continuing Studies. In 1971, 225 students were
enrolled. The disappointingly low figure is interpreted as resulting from
other demands on officers' services. The enrollment goal for 1980 is
700 students, although there, is every indication that other requirements
will continue to take precedence over the assignment of officers to
service colleges.
The URL-surface officer is encouraged to attend a service college,
whether it be the Naval War College, the Army, Air, or National War
College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, or one belonging to
an allied nation. "Service college education should be the goal of every
15
professional naval officer."
What is the URL officer to derive from professional education? What
does such education convey? Change has brought a feeling among some that
the old sense of military professionalism is on the wane. Whatever was
once the mystique of being part of a tightly knit professional body has
become a vague malaise in which service has become only a job. There
"From the Chief of Naval Personnel," The Officer Personnel Newsletter
,
July 1970, p. 1.
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is a sense that "others" are making the military's decisions, that
military skills have been absorbed by civilian skills and are now
dominated by them, and that technology and non-military criteria are
dictating strategy, with industry's technical representatives main-
taining the weapons systems and the operations analysts specifying
their use. The result is a frustration not alleviated by the curricu-
lums of the Naval, Army, Air, or National War Colleges.
At the end of World War II the decision was to make curriculums
of service colleges essentially civilian. This decision reflected the
fact that impact of the civilian economy on the conduct of the war was
so overriding as to make military understanding of it of paramount
importance. It was also at this time that the curriculums were designed
to help remedy the relatively low level of general education among the
vast bulk of the military's officer corps. (This is no longer a problem.)
Then came the more recent emphasis on international relations and the
study of competing ideologies, but by the late 1960's critics said that
this focus was out of date and should no longer be a first priority for
a senior professional military school. Present day missions of the war
colleges are criticized as being broad and global efforts to serve
intellectual smorgasbord which culminates in the presentation to gradu-
ates of license, not direction.
Does a service college really care what an officer learns there?
One may argue that the relatively high demand made by the Navy, and the
other services, for war college graduates derives more from the pro-
fessional qualifications that led to an officer's initial selection to
the college than from the instruction the officer received.
Students say that their attendance at a service college is intellectu-
ally stimulating and a "broadening experience," yet there is doubt that they
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learn all they can, or if the learning is as directly related as it might
be to what they should know. A look at the required reading of students
at the service schools reveals that it is not as extensive as that
generally required for graduate courses. If it were, then there would be
no time for such activities as the George Washington University Program
which is offered in conjunction with service college courses and leads
to a Masters in International Affairs.
Certain aspects of service college academic life differ quite radically
from present day postgraduate academic life. For example:
1. Unlike the policy of most graduate professional schools, the
military faculty member can be selected because he is a good, all-round
student and he need not be an expert in a specialized field. He may not
receive either specific training or education for the teaching assignment
at the service school.
2. Students at service colleges claim to learn more from each other
than through other modes of instruction. This is not surprising in view
of the fact that a considerable number of the officer students are
selected for the service colleges after they have completed the duty for
which they are presumably about to be prepared. Redundancy between
faculty and student body in terms of experience and education indicates a
serious waste of manpower in the assignment-education systems.
From the areas just described it is possible to assume that the
underlying problems associated with professional military education cannot
be answered until directional policy is revised to address certain funda-
mental questions. The Naval War College cannot re-examine policy prescrib-
ing curriculum purposes and goals until there is a definition in today's
terms of what "professional military education" is all about. For those
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venturing a definition the answer is too often a Utopian blend of the old
idealistic mix which describes the officer product and not the components
of the system designed to produce this product. Question: What is pro-
fessional military education? Answer: Education which instills or enhances
those qualities desired of a naval officer: intelligence, imagination,
technical knowledge, written and verbal skill, humor, adaptability,
ambition, aggressiveness, and a strong sense of discipline. Can curriculum
policies be formulated from this basis? Can they be designed to educate
URL surface officers for their roles in the new "compact and highly
select" Navy?
Assuming that the higher authority desires new definitions and guide-
lines, can the faculty of service schools be expected to make substantial
contributions to the search for new policies? Perhaps policy recommenda-
tions concerning professional military education might primarily come
from the student body. At the Naval War College, student studies have
been responsible for numerous policy recommendations governing diverse
aspects of Navy training and education. The studies, characterized by a
wide range of student expertise, are often more timely and pertinent than
many of the more formally constituted policy study groups which originate
at other government levels. It may be that students at the Naval War
College will re-define "professional military education." The College shows
the same trend now visible in many of today's civilian schools of higher
education: more participation of students at the policy and decision
making levels.
Should a URL surface officer, as a potential student, request assign-
ment to a service college or to some other program of higher education?
He is fortunate if he ever has the opportunity for either and typical if
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he is seldom afforded the opportunity for both. The officer's decision
is unnecessarily complicated by the antiquity, vagueness, and absence of
policy surrounding the mission of "professional military education."
The Lag in Leadership Training
Every URL surface officer continually participates in some form of
leadership training. The Navy's leadership program is the core of the
authority-responsibility concept and, if it becomes inoperative, the
chain-of-command system fails to function.
The leadership role is the major one expected of the URL surface
officer. In an effort to determine what this role entails, the Navy has
sponsored various studies designed to develop research methods and to
obtain facts which would aid in the education, selection, training, and
assignment policies governing the officer as a leader. Such studies
have important implications for the training of officers as both adminis-
trators and leaders, but current assignment and education policies fail to
utilize the information now available from such areas as training in
human relations skills.
In 1971 two student forums \i/ere convened at the Naval War College.
One represented the College of Naval Warfare and the second the College of
Naval Command and Staff. Discussion concerned possible means of improving
the Navy along certain lines being pursued by the Chief of Naval Operations,
The forums identified broad areas of personnel and material as the main
concerns of today's Navy, but the focus was upon personnel problems which
1 (\
Harold Guetzkow, ed., Groups, Leadership and Men . Research in Human
Relations (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1963).
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were summed up in these statements:
1. Difficulty in recruiting motivated and trainable
volunteers. This could be further aggravated by
the all volunteer force concept.
2. Severely reduced effectiveness of assigned personnel*
3. An unacceptable retention rate.
From analysis of a survey conducted for the formus at the College of
Naval Command and Staff it was determined that among the officer groups
the single, most important cause of poor retention was lack of job
satisfaction. Two areas were given as the prime factors contributing to
this problem: (1) insufficient knowledge about the handling and management
of people, and (2) an overcommitted Navy which finds itself involved in
1 R
deficit management. What could be done to improve the situation? The
response indicated that the Navy had "...lost a degree of effectiveness in
the organization and the satisfaction of our people because we have nor
19followed established principles of leadership and the chain of command."
This situation could be improved by restoration of authority and account-
ability to the person who has the assigned responsibility. The forums
recommended revised leadership training programs which would be based on
an integration of behavioral science techniques along with the Navy's
traditional concepts of authority, responsibility and accountability.
The forums also stated that another contributing factor to the lack of
job satisfaction involved certain deficiencies in the education of command-
20
ing officers. The conclusion was that the Navy fails to properly train
"A Response to Z-Gram 62," ed. by Commander Theodore R. Swartz, United














and develop commanding officers in managerial and technical specialty
skills. Present school sources were considered inadequate to provide
all officers with sufficient managerial expertise. Among recommendations
concerning such problems were the following:
1. All junior officers whould receive training in basic
management skills which would include information on
current socioeconomic trends and on human behavioral
patterns.
2. All officers should receive continuing training in manage-
ment concepts related to their level of responsibility.
For example, the officer should be a graduate of a
department head course, XO course, or CO course before
assuming that job.
3. In order to further prepare prospective commanding
officers a philosophy of practical development of
managerial and technical skills should be emphasized at
the unit commander level of the officer's career. 21
Whatever policy additions or revisions occur in the leadership program
will definitely affect the career pattern of the URL surface officer.
Policy is yet to be developed which will implement programs designed to
eliminate the above short-comings associated with officer leadership
training.
Shortfalls in leadership training point out a demand for a new model
of corporate activity. Navy policymakers need to pay attention to studies
such as the one conducted in 1970 by Behavioral Systems Associates, a
management consultant firm specializing in interpreting the impact of
the cultural revolution on business. The firm studied what there is about
corporate environment that accounts for the rising attrition rate among
22




Lawrence Foss, "The Psychedelic Seventies New Styles for Those in Business?"
Management of Personnel Quarterly (Summer 1970): 2-10.
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career image conceived by significant portions of today's college students
and college graduates. A new socio-psychic landscape has emerged with the
technological process, and the values associated with it are personal,
communal, existential, and non-material. Social and ethical priorities
have changed from emphasis on how to make a living to how to make living
work.
The study concluded by suggesting that modern modes of being have to
be entertained and different life styles tried on. How? The corporate
environment can, through a system analytical approach to sensitivity
training and group dynamics, find techniques which will bring about a
kind of openness and leveling, a reciprocal sensitizing of culture to
counter-culture. The Navy must somehow also develop similar techniques
for integration into officer leadership training.
The Identification-Utilization Problem: What Is a URL Officer ?
There are many unanswered problems concerning the assignment and
education of all URL officers and only some of the ones particularly
applicable to the URL surface officer have been described thus far.
At the crux of these issues lies the question: What skills does the
Navy expect of the URL officer? The pace of technological and social
change has definitely outdistanced most of the traditional replies.
The Navy has begun to answer the basic question through firm policy
guidelines, but there remains a confusion which surrounds just what it is
that major officer programs are trying to do. For too many years both
the education and assignment policies governing URL officers have wavered
between the murky and complicated battle lines of the traditionalist and
the specialist forces. Now, at last, it may be that the Navy's shift to
a smaller, compact and high-quality force concept will finally permit a
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rediscovery of what it is that the URL officer is expected to be.
In his appraisal of the Navy required in the 1970' s the Chief of
Naval Operations reached a number of conclusions which chart a new course
for the Navy and help to determine the role of the URL officer. One
decision which definitely affects officer education and assignment
policies is that major shore installation management and major weapons
systems procurement require and will receive the top officers in equal
measure to those needed for major command afloat. This conclusion
changes the sacrosanct doctrine which made sea command the main road to
flag rank, and it highlights the new level of specialization throughout
t
23
the Navy s officer corps. With the increasing complexity of modern
weapons systems more skilled, specially educated, and experienced officers
are needed both for operations at sea and for the management of pro-
curement and support ashore. Upgrading the prestige of shore commands
will attract more officers to management specialties and to assignments
in these commands, as well as open up the new paths to flag rank and
develop the weapons-support specialties needed by the Navy. The hope is
that by rewarding more specialized careers as co-equal to the classic
"command at sea," more flexibility will occur and thus enable the pro-
motion of officers who possess whatever skills the new Navy requires.
However, an emphasis on more specialists in the URL brings forth
the long-existing debate between advocates of the traditional officer
generalist concept and those who believe that the specialist can best
fulfill the demands of this age. The result, until recently, has been
a generalized URL career pattern with outstanding performance at sea the
Rear Admiral G.G. Morrison, United States Navy, "Major Command,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (August 1971): 14-17.
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key to continued promotion. Since 1909, with inauguration of the post-
graduate education concept, graduate education was considered desirable
because it strengthened an officer's warfare specialties and increased
his usefulness ashore and at sea. Assignments were made on the basis of
general performance and availability. The pre-World War II assignment
system pursued policy primarily based upon the officer's previous perform-
ance rather than on any special qualifications or education.
In 1920 the Knox, King and Pye Board conducted the first comprehen-
sive study of the education and training of Line officers. The Board
recognized the necessity of providing specialized educational training and
recommended that planned detailing cover the education and duty assign-
24
ment throughout four general phases of the Line officer's career.
Phases Education
1. Division Officer Naval Academy Under
Graduate (or similar
background)
2. Department Head Generalist Line School
(or postgraduate education)
3. Commanding Officer (single ship) Junior War College
A. Flag Officer Senior War College
In addition to the above the Board recommended the establishment of a
General Line School and Senior and Junior War College courses.
It was the Board's conclusion that no officer could be equally pro-
ficient in all branches of his profession, that each should possess as
much knowledge of all as possible, and that each must specialize. The
goal of every line officer should be: (1) to have a good education,
9/
Secretary of the Navy Study of Career Management, Appendix I , (Washington,
D.C.: Department of the Navy), August 1967, pp. F2-I-5.
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(2) to specialize in one field of Naval warfare (Surface, Submarine, or
25
Aviation), and (3) to specialize in one of four areas. The areas were:
1. Design and Production of Materiel
2. Manipulation of Materiel
3. Special Duty Only
4. Non-Materiel
Since 1920 the conclusions of the Knox, King and Pye Board provided
the basic philosophy for the assignment and education of line officers.
But the nagging problem has been the degree of relative importance to be
placed on each of the three primary goals a line officer must seek. The
technological impact of World War II brought a complexity and variety of
new weapons systems which increased the need for technical expertise at
sea. The growing size and complexity of the shore establishment required
technically trained officers. Needs rapidly outdistanced supply.
The subspecialization concept was born when the Navy began to assign
officers with particular educational or experience qualifications to
repetitive shore tours which required a certain area of knowledge. A
pattern emerged as more URL surface officers were educated and trained for
a subspecialty. This action maintained, and in some instances raised, the
technical level of the operating forces and also permitted an adequate
input of fleet experience to the supporting shore establishment. In 1959
the Chief of Naval Personnel announced official adoption of the subspecialty
?fi 27
concept. The officer corps was advised that:
25
These areas are now known as subspecialties.
2fi
Full implementation was delayed primarily because of the reluctance of
the URL officers to be fully committed to a subspecialty.
27




1. Officers would be required to sustain two successful
careers—one at sea in a warfare specialty and one
ashore in a subspecialty. Performance in a warfare
specialty would continue as an overriding requirement,
but a secondary career ashore would be required for
continued promotion.
2. Shore assignments for the graduate educated officer
would be in areas associated with his subspecialty
qualification.
3. Promotion concepts would be changed to recognize
the desirability of continuity in career patterns
ashore.
Problems existed in determining how the URL officer would choose and
pursue a subspecialty. The basic precept of the subspecialty concept
is that the officer acquires additional qualification through a com-
bination of formal education, functional training, and practical
experience. Although there is no substitute for formal education in the
technical subspecialty field, considerable diversity exists in the
degree of effort and time required to attain basic qualification in other
fields. Such differences involve service school educational programs of
varying duration, and graduate programs that may require 3 years of study
at civilian institutions.
Since adoption of the subspecialty program, the graduate education
quotas for URL officers, although funded and approved, have not been
filled. This education shortfall is attributed to a shortage of
academically qualified candidates, lack of motivation in the URL com-
munity for technical graduate education, and non-availability of officers
because of operational commitments in the naval warfare subspecialty.
Successful implementation of the subspecialty concept still requires a
compromise between (1) the requirement for raising the advanced educational
base of the officer corps in order to establish a minimum technological
qualification for utilization in career fields, and (2) the degree to
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which availability, capability, and preference permits URL officers to
sub specialize.
Since 1959 at least 9 major studies have been conducted which served
to identify and reemphasize the problems associated with URL subspeciali-
zation. At the core of many troubles is the traditional bias which
favors the generalist over the specialist. Selection board results have
demonstrated that narrowing career patterns of URL officers are not
always career-enhancing. Career management is still faced with the
problem of attracting intellectually capable and promotable officers into
subspecialty areas and then providing equitable promotion opportunities.
The officers who have the highest promotion records in the URL are those
who have had command, master degree education, and minimal subspecialty
utilization.
Promotional concepts have been based upon the precept that selection
depends on relative excellence of performance, primarily at sea, rather
than upon requirements for a subspecialty quota. There were no sanctu-
aries for the uniquely qualified or super-educated. The URL officer,
particularly in selection to senior ranks, has been unable to afford any
long absence from sea, even for the purpose of acquiring formal education.
There must be radical change to assure that the more specialized URL
officer can select a career from a spectrum of career patterns. One
major step toward this goal was taken by the Chief of Naval Operations
29
when he implemented the Operational/Managerial concept. This policy







The policy statement announcing this concept is contained in Appendix II
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Establishment of the Operational/Managerial career concept breaks
many of the traditional molds. "There is no ideal career plan to follow
—
but rather a variety of paths and cross-paths from which to choose, based
upon individual preference, service needs, qualifications, and per-
..30formance record."
The Navy's first major program to implement the new career concept was
announced in July 1971. The program is designed to develop small com-
munities of officers with considerable expertise in various countries,
areas, and regions of the world, and is an effort to meet the Navy's
growing need for specialization in the area of politico-military
policy and strategic planning.
Even in the face of reduced operating forces, the
requirement for officers with these abilities will
not decrease and can be expected to increase. To
meet this demand within the constraints of the new
environment, it is necessary to insure that some of
those officers who become specialized in politico-
military affairs, strategic planning, political
science and foreign relations become true specialists
in the various countries, areas and regions. It is
also necessary that they be fully utilized in order
to meet the commitments for country, area and
regional trained officers with the minimum infringe-
ment upon the other pressing requirements for
talented officers. -31
Extensive study is underway regarding the entire Operational/Managerial
concept. There will be other programs which, like the one just described,
are designed to meet the requirements of a smaller, more professional
Navy through the use of fewer, more highly qualified specialists. Some
of these officers will command the operating forces, others will manage
the shore establishment, and there will be a need in the URL community for
The Officer Personnel Newsletter , Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington,
D.C., Vol. 16, No. 1, July 1971, p. 2.
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel Notice 1040
(BUPERSNOTE), of 14 July 1971, enclosure (1).
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many various mixes of operational and managerial skills.
Officer jobs have recently been reviewed as part of a professional
manpower postgraduate study conducted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
All officer billets for unrestricted and restricted line and for staff
corps were considered to determine which should carry education sub-
specialty codes. The review identified some 5,200 billets requiring
officers with a master's degree and 63 billets requiring officers with non-
medical doctorates. As of December 1971 the Navy had on active duty some
74,000 officers; 155 of these held non-medical doctorate degrees, and
approximately 9,000 more held a master's or the equivalent. Because of
sea-shore rotations and career patterns not all of these officers are
available to fill the coded billets at each assignment period, nor can
they be if some are to have other kinds of sea and command duty. The
Navy figures that it must have about 2.5 officers for each coded billet
and plans its educational training accordingly. Although the report
emphasizes the need for more officers with master's degrees, the overall
32
number of postgraduate selectees will probably not change.
When, and if, the role of the URL officer is fully defined, no
guarantee of sureness will surround the individual's future. Hope for a
precise and predictable career pattern will most likely remain aspira-
tion, not reality.
Today, in the background of many young officer's lament
over vexations in the naval career there is an under-
standable yearning for certainty and predictability, the
appealing thought of a steady march onwards and upwards
by way of milestones and checkpoints that are clearly
marked for many years ahead. It includes the hope that
the future might hold fewer surprises, and that his
personal and family life might be ordered to a greater
extent than he has known thus far. Such wishes are
natural and reasonable, and are shared as well by officers
of many more years in the service. The main difference
32
"Officer Jobs Reviewed," Navy Times , 12 January 1972, p. 3.
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between the young officer and the older one is that it
is the latter' s experience that the Navy—and the world-
seldom accords events the certainty that most of human-
kind would choose. -^
Goodbye, Mickey Mouse?
The naval organization most directly concerned with administering
the policies of officer education and assignment is the Bureau of Naval
Personnel, but formulation and approval of these policies is very much
the business of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
.
Since 1970 when Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., became Chief of Naval
Operations the most visible and frequently used instruments of change
have issued from the CNO level. Policy directives have become widely
known within and without the Navy as "Z-grams," so titled for their
originator, Admiral Zumwalt. The "Z-grams" are the most tangible evi-
dence of sweeping policy changes occurring in today's Navy and, conse-
quently, the most controversial.
The following are instances of selected "Z-grams" which affect the
education and assignment of URL surface officers and which are considered
tangible evidence of response to pressures for change.
Z-gram 14: Eliminates collateral duties given to junior officers,
such as cigarette fund custodian and health officer. Some 18 collateral
duties were scuttled and another 18 are being revised to permit petty
officers to do certain jobs formerly assigned to officers, such as movie
officer and athletic officer. This Z-gram also requests any further
recommendations which could lead to the reduction or modification of other
collateral duties.
3 Captain Robert H. Smith, United States Navy (Retired), "The Naval
Officer's Career—"Exigencies of the Service"," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings (October 1971) :21.

27
Z-gram 19 : In a move which will recognize high performance through
visible accelerated promotion opportunity the authorized percentage of
below-the-zone officer promotion selections was increased from 5% to 15%
in the lieutenant commander thru captain grades.
Z-gram 31 : Establishes competition among junior officers in ship-
handling. All officers, except commanding officers and lieutenant com-
manders serving as executive officers, are eligible to compete on a
voluntary basis with the winners permitted to choose their next duty
station in regards to ship type, homeport, school, and area of duty,
either in the continental U.S. or overseas.
Z-gram 36 : A personal message from CNO to all commanders, commanding
officers, and of ficers-in-charge which encourages improvement of standards
of service at facilities in such areas as personnel, disbursing, and
others dealing in services in and for the Navy's people.
Z-gram 41 : Announces the establishment of a forum on Command
Excellence to be hosted by the President of the Naval War College. This
policy also institutes a chair at the War College for Surface Strike War-
fare, a position to be filled by either a commander or captain with a
record of outstanding performance in command. The objective is to
derive maximum benefit for officer corps education from the distilled
experience of eminent commanding officers.
Z-gram 42 : Establishes a policy whereby ensign and lieutenant
(junior grade) officers can be given every opportunity to acquire
necessary qualifications for a naval career during their first four years
in the Navy.
Z-gram 46 : Reduces the paperwork that was required in the manpower,
maintenance, and management (3-M) system. Inspections, documentation, and
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associated paperwork were pinpointed for reduction on most ships of both
Fleets.
Z-gram 48 : Establishes a new office in the Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Pers-P. The office's primary mission is to assume the fullest possible
communications with individuals throughout the Navy. Pers-P is comprised
of five divisions concerned with administering recreation programs, pro-
viding information and answering questions, coordinating career informa-
tion publications, assisting in the fields of personal affairs, and
administering family assistance services and benefits for both the Navyman
and his dependents.
Z-gram 53 : Authorizes the annual publication of a list of available
billets intended for junior officers. The list will provide a ready
reference of career assignments throughout the Navy and will highlight
geographical location, required specialty or qualifications, and rank
needed.
Z-gram 54 : Outlines the means the Chief of Naval Operations will use
to learn from Fleet and shore establishments the suggested improvements for
the Navy. Retention study groups, visits by the CNO to Fleet and shore
units, and meetings with senior naval officers are three of the programs
outlined in a policy designed to permit any individual in the Navy with
helpful suggestions the opportunity to be heard.
Z-gram 55 : Initiates a pilot program for study in the field of human
relations. This is an effort to improve the management of human resources.
Z-gram 57 : Eliminates a number of abrasive and demeaning "Mickey
Mouse" regulations. Included in a long list are clarifications of rules
on hair-styles, sideburns, beards or moustaches, standardization in the




Z-gram 59 : Authorizes a program whereby selected officers can spend
up to one year in independent research and study for professional develop-
ment at full pay and allowances in areas mutually heneficial to the
officer and the Navy. Thirty selectees will be authorized each year for
study under this program. Study may be performed at governmental depart-
ments and agencies, private and public corporations, foundations, and
educational institutions.
Z-gram 64 : Encourages commanding officers to increase the oppor-
tunities for junior officers to practice ship-handling.
Z-gram 66 : Deals with equal opportunity and directs each base,
station, and aircraft squadron commander, and ship commanding officer to
appoint a minority group officer, or senior petty officer, as an assistant
for minority affairs and with direct access to the commanding officer.
Z-gram 69 : Announces the institution of new command selection pro-
cedures which eliminate previous requirements of deep draft command for
flag rank selection. Recognition of the management skills needed in
major shore station commands and weapons systems acquisition programs are
stated as suitable prerequisites for flag selection, together with the
policy that a major command in any of the stated categories would be
favorably viewed by selection boards.
Those who do not approve of "Z-grams" and "Z-moves" state that such
policy and activity will not materially enhance the retention percentages,
but, instead, will decidedly reduce efficiency and effectiveness. Such
critics point with alarm at the Air Force and declare that its efforts to
provide a more open system have resulted in consistently low morale and
precarious re-enlistment figures. Therefore, the argument continues, if
the Navy is to attract and maintain dedicated people capable of keeping the
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watch during long periods of civilian disregard, the Navy cannot be a
comfortable maritime organization.
On the other hand, "Z-grams" succeed in saying that the Navy cannot
begin to catch-up with the pace set by change until it first is willing to
enter the race. The present CNO seems to be making promising efforts in
the direction of constructive institutional adaptation. Do techno-
logical and social changes permit a choice in any other direction?
During World War II the Navy clearly emerged from its decades of
indifference to research and technological innovation. Yet while the
Navy's technical environment raced ahead, while new warmth and cordiality
characterized the relationship between the Navy and the nation's scientific
and academic communities, little was done to lessen the impact of new
systems upon the Navy's people.
The Navy's most conspicuous failure after World War II
was in not extending this new cordiality between itself
and the academic world to the social and behavioral
sciences. In part this may have been because the social
and behavioral scientists were much later than the
physical scientists and mathematicians in demonstrating
the relevance of their research to problems concerning
military men, and it was therefore not surprising that
the military men, including the naval officers, would
not have been initially impressed with the benefits to
be gained from warm ties with these newcomers to
scientific research. 34
In the 1950 's it became apparent to the Department of Defense that
some of its most critical manpower policy issues were related to problems
of personnel quality. Any systematic appraisal of the qualitative per-
sonnel needs of the Services first requires facts about occupational
structure—the number and types of specialists required and the extent
3 Vincent Davis, The Admiral's Lobby (North Carolina: University of
North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 176-177.
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to which needs were being met. It was not until the mid-1950 's that this
information was provided, as a whole, to the DOD. It can be argued that
the tardy incorporation of qualitative factors adversely affected the
education and assignment policies of the Armed Forces' officer corps.
For the Navy the "Z-grams" vividly show the Navy's late-blooming struggle
to re-wire elements of the management system controlling the most
important resource: people.
Prescriptions and Prognoses
Implementation of the all-volunteer military concept and establishment
of a smaller, highly skilled naval force demand that the Navy must now
make every effort to determine the most efficient and effective means of
utilizing its officer talent. Are present and proposed policies designed
to achieve this? The question cannot be readily, absolutely answered.
Certain instances described in this paper illustrate attempts to improve
existing policies and to devise new ones capable of retaining and attract-
ing officer talent. It may be that not enough is being done to create
necessary change for the fact remains that dissatisfaction with the
utilization of talent continues to be a major cause of the premature
resignation of able officers.
For the Navy of the future to be a useful, viable organization,
great changes must be initiated today. This will severely task
the perception and ingenuity of Navy leadership at all levels.
New, opportunistic thinking is the most important need—think-
ing that can replace, restore, or revitalize concepts of
goals, organization, operation, command and control, equipment
and manpower in terms of the real present and future, not the
past. 35
Colonel Raymond C. Shreckengorst , United States Marine Corps, "Science,
Technology, and Change: Implications for the Navy," Naval War College
Review (November 1971): 14.
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Thinking and planning in an overcentralized and over-staffed
bureaucracy have not kept pace with technological and social change.
Better, if not optimal, utilization of the URL surface officer can be
secured through some of the policy changes referred to earlier in this
paper, yet much remains to be explored. In the final argument it is the
Navy's people who must change the system, who must use the communica-
tions and abundant data available to them in order to bring theory and
practice into viable alignment with environment.
The mid-career group of naval officers has been identified as one
containing effective agents of change. In a study conducted by the
University of Denver's Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of
International Study it is suggested that the innovation advocate is most
likely to be found in the middle ranks of lieutenant commander, commander,
and captain. The study offers a profile of the officer agent of change:
he has been commissioned for at least ten years (twenty at the most), is
in his early 30' s to middle 40* s, and has been in the Navy long enough to
have acquired an organization-wide perspective and an affectionate con-
36
cern for the welfare and future of the whole organization.
But he has not been in the organization so long that
he is dull or cynical or matter-of-fact about it,
nor does he have sufficient rank and responsibilities
to cause him to be cautious in advocating proposals for
the Navy in deference to wider perspectives at higher
rank levels where a feel for the broader implications
of overall national policy problems are often found.
The innovation advocate tends to identify himself very
strongly with the Navy, and he tends to identify the
Navy's interests with the nation's interests.-*'
0£
It is interesting to note that more Navy officers than Navy scientists
were innovation advocates. The study found no regular civil service
employees or administrators among the innovators.
Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases
(Colorado: University of Denver, 1967), p. 52.
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Navy efforts to achieve a compact, more professional officer group cannot
afford to overlook this group which holds the greatest potential for
effecting change. Manpower planning which governs education and assign-
ment must concentrate on finding new ways to cultivate and utilize the
leaders in the mid-career officer group.
In 1965 Dr. James C. Shelburne and Dr. Kenneth J. Groves published
a study describing training and education programs provided in the
Armed Forces. It is one of the few studies which alerted the American
public to the consequences for national life of a program which enrolls
some 400,000 persons annually. Although no attempt was made to evaluate
the programs or judge the manner in which they were organized and con-
ducted, the study concludes with the pinpointing of certain problem areas.
The Navy in its efforts to improve officer education and assignment
either has yet to explore, or might further explore, aspects of the
following areas of concern identified by the study.
Centralization of authority. In view of the trend toward greater
unification of the services, the study suggests that the combination of
education and training programs would eliminate costly duplication of
facilities.
Determination of requirements. There is a need for more effective
reporting procedures in the identification of training and education
requirements. The annual reports of the separate services to the Defense
Advisory Committee on Education in the Armed Services were criticized as
being confusing. However, the point was made that confusion exists in
all the debate which surrounds the government's role in education, and
this situation continues at present.
3
James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. Groves, Education in the Armed Forces




Retention of personnel. "The services ... will need to continue their
efforts toward developing selection and assignment procedures to insure
that highly trained individuals are given adequate opportunity to practice
their skills and to enjoy the rewards ordinarily expected for achieve-
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ment in any of the vocations and professions." This area emphasizes
the impact which the military's training and education programs have
upon the motivation of personnel toward military careers. The study
points out that none of the services provide career opportunities
designed to develop highly qualified staffs of recognized scholars and
teachers who can manage and instruct in the education and training pro-
grams. (The Navy has expected that its URL surface officers could fulfill
instructional assignments after completion of 4-week instructor training
courses. These are compact, "crash courses" designed to teach prepara-
tion of lecture plans and acceptable delivery style. The officer who
may be a good teacher has not been given the opportunity to fully practice
teaching skills.)
Educational lag. This area points out that military education and
training programs are faced with the difficult task of making effective
contributions to the advancement of military art and science while also
avoiding any educational lag behind technological advancement. Among
the pitfalls is overcommitment to any particular tactic, strategy or
weapon system. The degree of success to be achieved by these programs
depends upon the ability to adjust these programs to a rapidly changing
world.
The Shelburne and Groves study identifies some of the broad and chronic
problem areas commonly shared by the Armed Forces, but the study is meant







Perhaps the one study which will most significantly affect education
and assignment policies of the URL surface officer commenced in 1969.
The Future Professional Manpower Requirements Study (FPMRS) began the
development of a ten-year projection of the Navy's professional man-
power requirements and an analysis to determine the potential for meeting
such requirements under existing policies and inputs. The study concen-
trated on the optimal utilization of P-coded officers (those with a
40
Masters degree) within their specialties. The study's ultimate goal
is "...to provide information, tools, and mechanisms which will con-
tribute to systematic, rational decisions on Navy Manpower Management
problems such as the following:
1. Determination of the mix of professional manpower
among officers, Civil Service and civilian contract
personnel needed to man the Naval Establishment.
2. Determination of the mix of professional manpower among
unrestricted line, restricted line, staff corps or
possible new categoreis of officers.
3. Establishment of educational requirements for officer pro-
curement.
4. Management of each professional educational skill area on
a total Navy basis.
5. Determination of the proportion of the total officer input
to postgraduate education to be allocated to each of the
various curricula.
6. Coordination between military and civilian professional
manpower planning.
7. Early identification of emerging professional manpower utilization
fields. 41
Another study in the FPMRS series is presently being conducted to
forecast 5-10 year requirements. The results will be used to determine
a new billet base.
Future Professional Manpower Requirements Study Report, Volume I,
Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., forwarded to a Distribution
List as the enclosure to the Chief of Naval Operations letter of 25 May
1969, pp. i and ii.
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The FPMRS found that a substantial growth is likely in the Navy's
requirements for professionally educated officers and civilians in twenty-
one fields. Requirements for P-coded billets will increase from about
5,200 to approximately 7,600 by 1979.
The present professionally educated officer situation can
be described as bleak. In the majority of fields, the
billets currently authorized for URL officers could only
be kept filled with educationally qualified officers by requir-
ing them to specialize to a degree which would be incompatible
with the essential sea-going elements of a URL career. The
majority of Restricted Line (RL) and Staff Corps (SC) com-
munities now suffer from even worse shortages of educationally
qualified officers.^
Between Fiscal Years 1960 and 1969 the Navy was unable to meet its
annual postgraduate education goals. Annual shortfalls were 300-500
officers per year. In Fiscal 1970, 1,100 officers were scheduled to
enter various postgraduate curricula, but the previous decade of defici-
encies will take time to overcome and the problem will increase if require-
ments for professional manpower increase to the extent the FPMRS fore-
casts for 1979. The study estimates that about 1,150 officers per year
(FY 70-79) should receive postgraduate education in order to meet minimum
requirements for maintenance of current Unrestricted Line/Restricted
Line/Staff Corps ratios. However, a more satisfactory degree of flexi-
bility for personnel distribution would be achieved if about 1,600
officers yearly received postgraduate education.
What will be the affect upon education and assignment patterns of
the URL surface officer in the event that short-falls continue in post-
graduate education quotas? The study suggests that the Navy must then









1. Procurement of career officers who have already completed post-
graduate education. (It may be that slumps in the civilian job market
will make a military career more enticing, but the early 1970 's will be
crucial years in determining the success of the all-volunteer Armed
Forces concept. It is interesting to note that in 1972 only one out of
every five women applicants for appointment to become an officer in the
URL surface group was accepted. Although the authorized active duty
number of women URL surface officers is presently fixed at 600, the
Navy's manpower needs of the 1970' s may revise this figure upward.)
2. Enlarging Restricted Line communities or establishing new com-
munities in fields where URL shortages are acute and a large growth is
forecast. (The primary objection to this alternative is that the cost
entails resultant diminution of the sub-specialist concept and the loss
of seagoing experience to the affected billets. However, it may be
that value attributed to sea-going experience is disproportionately
weighted because of traditional concepts.)
3. Substituting either Civil Service or contractor positions for
P-coded billets where recent military experience is not essential. (In
the event that this alternative is adopted, more exacting methods and
procedures must be employed than those previously used to "civilianize"
billets. The suggestion raises substantive questions regarding what is
"military experience" these days? Military experience is an integral
part of "professional education," but, as discussed earlier in this paper,
there is confusion surrounding what it is the latter should entail. The
Navy's military commitments in Viet Nam meant that for each individual
actually in a combat area approximately 6 others were in a support capacity,
All were having a "military experience.")
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The 1969 FPMRS study also sought data which would identify emerging
new fields the Navy must supply with professionally trained manpower.
Forecast panels suggested the following fields. Asterisks identify four
areas in which requirements for professionally trained Navy manpower
appeared likely to emerge in 1970 and 1971. (Requirements for the four
areas have emerged.)
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EMERGING FIELDS SUGGESTED BY MANPOWER PANELS
Biomedical Engineering Hydronautics
Bionics Integrated Logistics
Ceramic Engineering Laser Technology
Crisis Management Magnetohydrodynamics
Cryogenics "Ocean Engineering
Cybernetics Political Civil Action
Education Super Conductivity
Electro Optics Shore Facilities Planning
Energenics ^Systems Engineering
Fluidics Taxation
^Foreign Area Studies Technical Data Mgmt
Heat Pipes Technical Documentation
Holography Thermionics
*Human Factors Engineering Thermo-Electrics
The Foreign Area Studies field utilizes URL surface officers and so,
either directly or indirectly, could a majority of the other fields.
The Future Professional Manpower Requirements Study represent a
major on-going effort to determine needs in the face of rapid obsolescence
of the data base. This Study and other instances described throughout
this paper suggest broad aspects of a race which hopes to at least keep
pace with change. Change creates a scenario in which answers lag behind
questions and demands a constant search for ways to assure the maximum
utilization of each officer's talents.
It is tempting, easy, and often impressive to call for more research








of new information and knowledge. The data which abounds from the
Navy's continuous involvement in the discovery and accumulation of
information reveals a situation which will continue to require the
issuance of new policies. In order to attain the goal of a more com-
pact, highly skilled officer corps, the following policy recommendations
are made.
The procedure used to select officers for postgraduate education
should be revised so that each URL surface officer, upon reaching the
point at which he is designated a career officer (LCDR grade) , auto-
matically is considered for postgraduate education. If selected, he
still has the option to decline. The existing policy, whereby an officer
is not considered unless he so requests, prohibits the selection of a
number of qualified officers who, for diverse reasons, fail to request
advanced education. Selection could provide the missing stimulus.
The accepted practice of obtaining an advanced degree through
"moonlighting" should be established as policy. Officers would be
granted periods of liberty during working hours for the purpose of attend-
ing classes and fulfilling academic assignments. Granting of this form
of liberty would remain the prerogative of each commanding officer.
"Moonlighting," as performed in pursuit of higher education, has failed
to receive the endorsement and support it needs and can obtain only when
sanctioned by official policy. The success of civilian job-study programs
indicates the possibilities of raising educational levels without sacri-
ficing billet needs.
44
An abundance of information is matched by suggestions for policy
changes. For example, at the 1969 U.S. Navy Career Motivation Conference
nearly 200 wide-ranging recommendations aimed at improving retention
programs, personnel administration, and service operations were made.
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The role of each command's education officer should be enlarged and
broadened. The tendency is for the education officer to devote most of
his efforts toward career counseling in programs concerning enlisted per-
sonnel. Consequently, career counseling for officers has become a hit-
and-miss affair in which the commanding officer and the personnel officer
assume the role of the education officer. Too frequently it is the
individual officer who must act as his own career counselor without the
best possible information available. As assignment and education needs
become more complex, each officer has a greater need to know about an
increasing number of factors which govern individual career plans. The
present system places the primary responsibility for dispensing career
information upon Assignment and Placement officers situated in Washington,
D.C. The system is sorely taxed, constantly accused of being impersonal
and unresponsive, and deluged in demands from the top and requests from
the bottom. The education officer could relieve some of the pressure
points by serving as the logical liaison between Washington's Assignment
and Placement people and a command's officer community.
The final recommendation is that the Navy should establish immediately
a subspecialty program for education specialists. The 1969 Future Pro-
fessional Manpower Requirements Study identified education as a field in
which the Navy would be expected to supply professionally trained man-
power. This is an identified need. The problems which surround officer
education and assignment make it an urgent need.
In conclusion, it is apparent that many problems are still unresolved
in the transition to a compact, more professional Navy. This paper
describes evidence that progressive and constructive policy directions
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are being taken. Yet there is also the picture of systems not ful-
filling their missions, others which are probably archaic, and those
which still require drastic change. And, as always, the clock continues
to run. If the Navy fails to fully develop and utilize its officer
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//-' Below zone selectees W/MD
# Total selectees W/MD
// Below zone selectees
# Total selectees.)
Key : P-Code = Officer with Masters degree. An officer selected from below
the zone is considered to be selected earlier than the time prescribed in
the normal career-selection pattern. Each Promotion Board may select a fixed
percentage of officers from (1) above the zone (previously not selected in the
normal pattern)
,
(2) in the zone (normal pattern) , and (3) below the zone
(early selection).
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CNO POLICY STATEMENT ON SPECIALIZATION
IN WARFARE SUBCATEGORIES
9 July 1971.
The requirements of our smaller, more professional Navy will demand
certain highly specialized officers in many of the subcategories of war-
fare specialization such as ASW, AAW, EW, and SOSUS and the warfare
supporting fields such as training, logistics and the more traditional
subspecialities, such as communications and intelligence. While both
the specialist and the generalist can perform well in the operational
environment, there is an acute need for the talents of a specialist with
concentrated education, training and experience in the warfare subcate-
gories to meet certain critical requirements afloat and ashore. Some of
these requirements can best be met by a restricted line or staff corps
specialist, but most require an officer whose background combines both
operational and technical or managerial experience.
In aviation and submarine operational specialization has become the
accepted norm. We have some aviators who have transitioned from one
class mission to another, and we have some who have obtained broadening
experiences from non-flying operational tours which developed operational
expertise outside their flying experience. The majority of aviators,
however, have had repeat tours in the same mission with concentrated train-
ing and experience in that mission both at sea and ashore. Similarly
most submariners have had repeat tours in their ASW or strategic mission.
In the surface Navy of the past, a broadening experience with tours in
engineering, operations and weapons on several classes of ships was
considered essential to the development of the well rounded naval officer.
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There has and will continue to be a need for generalists, but there
has developed a more definite requirement for the specialist as well.
This requirement includes command-at-sea billets, which can be filled by
either the generalist or the specialist, but exists principally
to meet our shortages ashore of experts needed for the evaluation and
development of oncoming weapons systems, new tactics, force levels, and
long-range plans. This specialization is necessary for these and other
requirements where operational level knowledge is an essential input into
the needs of the new Navy. To adjust to these conditions, we have
formulated the spectrum approach to officer career development. We need
highly talented URL officers with various mixes of operational and
managerial experience concentrated in certain subcategories of Naval
warfare and related supporting activities. With the implementation of
destroyer school for junior officers and the PCO/PXO curricula for
middle grade surface officers, the requirement for a tour in every ship
department and on a mix of ships is no longer necessary. Much of the
broadening experience that in the past could be obtained only by such
cross touring is now imparted through the above-mentioned training pro-
grams.
We have found that high performing surface officers who have been
generalists and those who have had repeat tours in a warfare subcategory
such as ASW, AAW, communications or intelligence have proven to be
equally well qualified to command. Similarly, high performing officers
who have served in the amphibious or service forces, through the use of
formalized transition programs, can move into the destroyer force (and
vice versa) with little or no degradation in performance for having made
such a transition. Again the goal is for a spectrum of career paths
with some officers highly specialized, some very generalized, and many
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mixes in between. Recent experience has confirmed the desirability of
this spectrum approach in all three warfare specialties. We intend to
move even further in that direction in the development of the smaller,
more professional officer corps of the new Navy.
It is the policy of the CNO that both the generalist and the
specialist are essential in our operating forces. Either a generalist
or a specialist may command any of our operating units. They will receive
equal consideration for command-at-sea and promotion. Command screening
is by board action and will be based upon performance as reflected in
the officer's official record. Providing an officer has that requisite
performance, his degree of specialization will enhance his promotion
advancement or operational assignment. Project management, shore com-
mand, and other billets requiring specialists are extremely important
to the Navy. Many are considered to be equivalent to command-at-sea,
and will lead equally to the highest positions of responsibility in the
Navy of the future. This is not intended to downgrade the important nature
of command at sea or to imply that the officers who perform well in com-
mand will not be promoted. It is the intent that officers coming up
through various career paths will have an equal opportunity to reach flag
rank. There will no longer be an exclusive path to the top in any
specialty. The key will continue to be fitness to meet the Navy's future
needs as demonstrated by performance and experience in specialized as
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